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ABSTRACT

Author: Jankovski, Toni. MS
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: August 2018
Title: The Multi-Market Effects of Ethanol Policy under Imperfect Competition
Committee Chair: Juan P. Sesmero
The literature on the effects of ethanol policies on agricultural markets is vast and
thorough. The overwhelming majority of this literature examines global and national
markets. Yet, several studies have documented the fact that corn procurement by ethanol
plants is highly geographically localized, suggesting that analyses at the national level
may masquerade substantial heterogeneity at the local level. This thesis examines how
the structure of local corn markets shape policy pass-through, and its implications on
welfare. We do so by combining a partial equilibrium displacement model with a
conjectural variations approach, which allows us to accommodate potential market power
exertion by ethanol plants when purchasing corn. The goal is to examine the effect of
policy interventions on multiple connected markets (corn, soybean, livestock, food, and
ethanol) under varying degrees of oligopsony power in the ethanol sector. Results show
that buyer power by ethanol plants does not have a large impact on efficiency, but can
drastically shift policy-induced rents to the ethanol sector in detriment of corn growers.
On the other hand, horizontal spillovers into the livestock and food sectors are limited by
the inelasticity of demand for these products with respect to their price. Oligopsony
power stems from the size of ethanol plants relative to corn supply within the relevant
geographical boundaries in which these plants operate; and it is alleviated by the presence
of other plants in the local market. Therefore, this diversion of policy-induced rents is
likely to take place in markets with few, geographically isolated plants as it is common
towards the edges of the U.S. Corn Belt.
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INTRODUCTION

1.1

Motivation and Contribution
Biofuel policies have received much attention in the literature, and justifiably so.

A number of studies indicate that policies supporting ethanol production have caused a
substantial shift in corn demand, increasing its price and the price of other, landcompeting commodities. This shift in corn demand has sent ripple effects into a number
of other, interconnected markets. Most prominently, the livestock and food sectors, direct
competitors of the ethanol industry for corn, have been negatively impacted by policies
supporting ethanol (Dhoubhadel et al. 2015; Suh and Moss 2017). With such concerns in
mind, the livestock industry requested the EPA to waive the ethanol mandate in 2012 to
release the pressure that a severe drought was to put on corn prices in combination with
the mandate, if it were kept in place. However, a number of studies have also shown that:
1) increased feedstock cost for livestock and food producers is at least partially offset by
increased output prices, and 2) ethanol co-products, widely used in animal ration feeds,
can mitigate the effect of ethanol on corn prices (Taheripour et al. 2010; Taheripour et al.
2011).
As it has been argued in the literature before, the impact of ethanol policies on
corn markets is likely to be affected by market structure, and more specifically, by
whether corn ethanol plants have the ability to exert market power when buying corn
from farmers (Saitone, Sexton, and Sexton 2008). This important aspect of corn ethanol
markets has been mostly overlooked in the literature. This is perhaps explained by the
low levels of concentration of the ethanol market at the national level. However,
estimates at the national level tend to underestimate -in some cases drastically- buyer
concentration ratios when markets are geographically localized. Many agricultural
procurement markets, including corn for ethanol, are characterized by high transportation
costs and few processors buying from many, spatially dispersed producers. These key
features make markets geographically localized, facilitating market power exertion by
processors (Sexton, 2013).
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The ethanol sector is highly connected with both the food and the livestock
sectors, with which it competes for corn (Figure 1.1). It also supplies the livestock sector
(but not the food sector) with the byproduct of its production process. It is usually
assumed that about a third of the quantity of grain that goes into ethanol production
comes out as distillers’ grains. Due to these multi-market connections, some of the rents
created by ethanol policies are suspected to dissipate by negative spillovers imposed upon
the livestock and food sectors. These negative spillovers are caused by the shift in corn
demand associated with ethanol subsidies (and partially offset by byproducts). However,
if ethanol plants source corn locally, the nature and magnitude of these spillovers will
depend upon the extent to which corn ethanol plants and livestock and food producers
agglomerate over space. Therefore, the overall welfare impact of ethanol depends
crucially on the structure of geographically localized markets and their influence on
policy pass-back. 1 The objective of this study is to characterize the relationship between
the structure of corn procurement markets and the welfare impacts of ethanol policies.
Land

Soybeans

Food Sector

Corn
Grain

Livestock
Feed

Ethanol
production

Exports

DGs
Figure 1.1 Simplified Version of the Corn System
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Pass-back, a term used and reviewed by Lloyd (2017), refers to the way a signal originated downstream
(in this case, the signal sent by the ethanol policy affecting demand faced by processors) moves upstream to
the input market (in this case farm-gate corn prices). This is in contrast to pass-through, a somewhat more
familiar term, which describes how signals or shocks originated upstream move downstream through the
vertical supply chain.
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We develop a log-linearized partial equilibrium displacement model including
agricultural supply of corn and soybeans, livestock, food, and ethanol. We augment this
model by using a first order condition that accommodates imperfect competition to
characterize corn demand from ethanol plants. We use a conjectural variations parameter
that nests monopsony, perfect competition, and a range of oligopsony structures as
special cases.
Our results indicate that the negative spillovers of ethanol policies are larger for
the food sector than they are for the livestock sector. This is largely explained by a higher
elasticity of demand for corn from livestock relative to the food sector, and byproducts of
the ethanol production, which offset the upward shift in corn supply due to increased
ethanol production. Nevertheless, such offsetting effect of byproducts is diminished by
the presence of dairy cows and poultry in the livestock sector, animals for which
penetration of byproducts in feed rations is lower. Moreover, a number of issues can also
limit penetration of byproducts in feed rations of swine, 2 a sector that is prominent in
Indiana’s livestock industry.
Second, our results suggest that the efficiency effects of market power are
relatively large. Our analysis finds plausible parameter values under which higher market
power is welfare-enhancing. The main reason for this counterintuitive finding is that
increased market power reduces pass-back and alleviates the negative spillovers of
ethanol policy on the livestock and food sectors. This phenomenon remained elusive in
previous studies because they either ignored multi-market effects, or imperfect
competition, or both. We now turn our attention to that literature and its findings.

1.2

Structure of the Thesis
We proceed to discuss the literature on ethanol policies in Chapter 2. We review

the methodological and market boundary assumptions made in that literature, and the
local-level issues that have been overlooked and constitute the focus of this thesis. The

2

According to the third edition of the DDGS User Handbook
(http://msue.anr.msu.edu/uploads/234/73378/2012_DDGS_Handbook-1.pdf ) inclusion of DDGS should
not surpass 30 percent of diet for nursery pigs weighing more than 7 kg, growing finishing pigs, and
lactating sows. These recommendations are based on the negative impact of DDGS on pork fat quality.
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conceptual framework and modeling strategy used to better understand the issues are
outlined in Chapter 3. Specifically, the partial equilibrium displacement model with
buying power by ethanol plants is developed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, and quantification
of key parameters of the model is described in Section 3.3. In Chapter 4, we simulate
policy shocks under a range of counterfactual deviations from the competitive
benchmark. Chapter 5 provides concluding remarks, particularly identifying the main
insights and counterintuitive findings in this thesis, as well as a discussion of further
research opportunities.

5

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

Observed Trends of Ethanol and Related Markets
The global ramifications of ethanol policies stem from the fact that corn is traded

across the globe. It is traded directly, but also through several other globally traded
products that use corn as an input. Moreover, since many crops compete with corn for
scarce land resources, the effects of policies transcend corn and spills over into other
important agricultural commodities. Consequently, some studies (e.g. Taheripour et al.
2011) have examined land use configurations underlying changes in equilibrium prices
and quantities of agricultural markets, as well as carbon emissions associated with these
shifts in land use. This strand of literature has been more prone to recognize the global
nature of the ramifications of ethanol deployment (Banse et al. 2007; Birur et al. 2008;
Taheripour et al. 2008; and Hertel et al. 2008).
A substantial part of the corn produced is exported. Another substantial part is
processed, and then exported. Therefore, corn can be exported directly and indirectly. To
understand the effects of ethanol policies on international agricultural markets it is
important to understand how those policies affect the final usage of corn within the US,
and the composition of exports. We report time trends of exports of key products related
to biofuels in Figure 2.2. A key fact immediately stands out. Exports of raw corn
experienced a dramatic drop from a peak in 2007 to the thrust in 2012, which coincides
with the growth in ethanol production. Simultaneously, indirect corn exports rise
substantially over the same period. Increases in biofuel exports explain a large portion of
this growth. Increases in meat exports also underpin the growth in indirect corn exports.
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Figure 2.2 Direct vs. Indirect Corn Trade, 1980 through 2015

The growth of meat exports is more carefully decomposed in Figure 2.3. These
figures show that the growth comes particularly from pork and poultry. It also reveals
that the growth in exports of these products was an already established trend well before
the ethanol boom, which did not start until 2006. These values suggest it would be
incorrect to fully attribute trends in meat exports to ethanol. On the other hand, reductions
in exports of raw corn do seem to take place contemporaneously with the ethanol boom.
But despite this drop, exports of raw corn recovered after 2012 to levels similar to the
pre-ethanol era. This fact points to an overall increase in corn production in the US.
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Figure 2.3 Example of Increased Corn Usage in Livestock and Dairy Sectors (Growing
Export Shares) versus Raw Corn Exports over Time, 1979/80 to 2016/17

Indirect exports of corn through meat and biofuel products are further
decomposed in Figure 2.4. In addition to the impressive growth of meat exports, Figure
2.4 reveals a large growth in exports of corn through biofuels-related products. In
particular, 0.8 MMT of corn were exported through biofuels in 2000. This figure
increased more than 15-fold by 2014, when a total of 13.38 MMT of corn were exported
through biofuels. The antithesis of this is the reduction in exports of milling and
refinement products, as well as corn gluten feed and meal, as shown in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.4 Overview of Corn Exported in an Indirect Form – a Number of Example
Industries Illustrated to Aid with Understanding Usage of Corn as an Ingredient with the
Purpose to Create a Final Product and Ultimately that Product be Exported.

Exports of corn through milling and refinement products, as well as corn gluten
feed and meal, experienced a drastic reduction, from a peak of 5.89 MMT and 5.4 MMT
in 1995 respectively, to 3 MMT and 1.2 MMT in 2015. Milling and refinement include
breakfast cereals, various sweeteners (such as high fructose corn syrup), other sugars and
oils, and finally, animal feed and meal refinements or mixes. Just as trends in exports
through meat products, the reduction in exports of corn through milling/refining and
gluten feed/meal started well before the ethanol boom; and seem to have partially
rebounded since 2009.
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Figure 2.5 Milling and Refining of Corn – Processed for Various Applications

Figure 2.6 shows a drastic increase in corn exported through biofuel-related
products. Total exports through biofuels include ethanol itself, but also exports of ethanol
byproducts. Figure 2.6 shows a sizable increase in corn ports through ethanol,
particularly after 2010. But the increase in corn exported through byproducts was just as
drastic. Most of this growth took place through direct exports of DDGs. But some also
took place through DDGs fed to livestock, that was eventually exported to other
countries. It should be noted that part of the volatility in exports of animal-related
products is explained by factors other than ethanol policies. The great recession and
stricter regulations following a world crisis of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)
and variant Creutzfeld-Jacob Disease (vCJD) in cattle (Coffey, Mintert, Fox, Schroeder,
& Valentin, 2011) seem to have affected meat exports.
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Figure 2.6 Export Shares of Corn via Biofuel Management and DDGs as By-Products of
Ethanol
2.2

Literature on Effects of Ethanol Policies
Since an important stated objective of biofuel policies was the reduction of

greenhouse gas emissions from transportation, a group of early studies focused on
quantification of biofuel effects on carbon emissions over their entire life cycle (e.g.
Wang 2005; Farrell et al. 2006). Another strand of literature more relevant to this study
has focused on the effect of corn ethanol policies on agricultural markets with a special
attention to the trends reviewed in Section 2.1. We focus our discussion on studies that
effectively illustrate key issues that remain unaddressed in the extant literature, and that
will constitute the focus of this thesis.
The time trends of exports reviewed in section 2.1 suggest that ethanol policies
have had far-reaching implications for multiple agricultural markets. They also point to
substantial shifts in market equilibrium at the national level. The impact of ethanol
policies on agricultural commodity markets at the national level is well documented. A
number of studies have focused on the effect of such policies on equilibrium prices and
quantities of related agricultural products (e.g. Elobeid et al. 2007; Tokgoz et al. 2007;
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Rajagopal et al. 2007; Khanna et al. 2008; McPhail and Babcock 2008a and 2008b; de
Gorter and Just 2008a and 2008b; Tyner and Taheripour 2008a and 2008b; de Gorter and
Just 2009; de Gorter and Just 2010; Cui et al. 2011; de Gorter and Just 2013; Carter et al.
2017). To highlight some recent quantitative contributions, Cui et al. (2011) present
findings that the RFS has increased corn prices by 34%, and soybean prices by 9%.
Similarly, using a partially identified structural vector auto-regression model, Carter et al.
(2017) find that the RFS and its revision, the RFS2, have increased corn price by 31%.
Their approach allows estimation under transitory shocks so as to capture changes in
mandates over time (Carter, Rausser, Smith, 2017).
Two prominent studies set a direct precedent for this thesis. First, Moschini et al.
(2016) built on a previous theoretical contribution (Moschini and Lapan, 2012) to
develop a multi-market equilibrium analysis. Their model links the U.S. agricultural
sector with the energy sector. It also links corn ethanol industry with the food, biodiesel,
soybeans, and soybean meal markets. The food and feed uses of corn are bundled into a
single sector. It is important to emphasize that in their model, the nested structure of the
Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) is taken into account. Competitive equilibrium
conditions determine the renewable identification number (RIN) prices, which therefore
serve as the integrating factor for these interconnected markets. This study parametrizes
the model based on known technical coefficients (e.g. ethanol yield per bushel of corn
processed; DDGS produced per bushel of corn processed) and elasticities calibrated to
replicate market equilibrium in 2015. Moschini et al. (2016) find that the RFS has had a
significant impact on U.S. agriculture, including the food/feed markets.
The findings in Moschini et al. (2016) are relevant for national markets. In other
words, the relevant market boundary for the linked sectors is the whole United States
territory. This 10,000-feet view of markets, while very relevant to understand aggregate
effects of ethanol policies, can mask substantial heterogeneity at a more disaggregated
spatial scale. Both the modeling strategy and results are strongly influenced by the level
of spatial aggregation chosen in the analysis. Of particular importance is the fact that the
assumption of perfect competition in the ethanol industry (which means ethanol plants do
not mark-down the price of corn and do not mark-up the price of ethanol) seems adequate
at the national level, but perhaps less innocuous at the local level.
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Many studies have extensively documented geographical localization of
agricultural procurement markets (e.g. Sexton, 2012; Adjemian et al., 2016; Mérel and
Sexton, 2017; Saitone and Sexton, 2017) and corn procurement in particular (McNew and
Griffith, 2005). This empirical feature of agricultural markets results from significant
transportation costs, in combination with a few large processors buying from atomized
and spatially dispersed agricultural producers. The geographically localized nature of
corn procurement suggests individual plants may face an upward sloping input supply,
which is at odds with the assumption of imperfect competition (McCorriston, 2002). This
observation seems reinforced by accumulated evidence on asymmetric price transmission
in agricultural markets in general, and post ethanol boom in particular (Drabik et al.
2016). This asymmetry is likely (though not necessarily) associated with market power
(Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004; Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2014).
This inspired Saitone, Sexton, and Sexton (2008) to re-examine the effect of
ethanol subsidies accounting for buying power by ethanol plants. They also account for
market power exerted by seed companies upon corn producers. The authors find that
market power can greatly affect the distribution of rents created by ethanol subsidies,
even if it does not significantly affect equilibrium quantities. While Saitone et al. (2008)
study carefully considered the implications of market power for the ethanol vertical
supply chain, it did not examine horizontal and vertical spillovers; i.e. it did not consider
how buying power exerted by ethanol plants mediates the effects of ethanol polices on
sectors that locally compete with ethanol for corn, namely livestock and food, and sectors
that compete with corn for land, namely soybeans.

2.3

Placing this Study in the Broader Literature
We build on previous work by Saitone et al. (2008), and set to examine local

effects of ethanol policies and the role of markets structure in shaping those effects. We
explicitly model horizontal and vertical spillovers of buying power by ethanol plants; i.e.
how market power influences the effect of policy on livestock, food, and soybean
production, as well as welfare implications of equilibrium displacement. Our focus on
local, interconnected markets warrants changes in modeling strategy relative to previous
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studies. More specifically, the set of markets that are considered endogenous or
exogenous in our analysis differs from those in the previous studies.
We explicitly model corn, soybeans, ethanol, food, and livestock markets. This
captures the predominant market structure in Indiana, our empirical study area.
Therefore, prices and quantities in these markets are endogenous. Equilibrium
displacement in a geographically localized market is unlikely to affect broader energy
markets. It is also unlikely to affect the biodiesel market. For instance, there are only
three biodiesel plants in Indiana. And none of them overlap spatially with corn ethanol
plants in the State. To model equilibrium displacement, we exploit a log-linear, partial
equilibrium comparative statics model first advanced by Hicks (1932) and subsequently
expanded by Muth (1964), Floyd (1965), and Wohlgenant (1993). We exploit this model
and information on key primitives (elasticities, shares, and technical coefficients) to
simulate ethanol policies and examine how buying power by ethanol plants mediate the
effects of policies. We examine equilibrium displacement, but focus on welfare
implications of policies conditional on market power by ethanol plants. In other words,
we quantify how market power affects the distribution of rents created by ethanol policies
along the vertical, and horizontal margins.
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METHODOLOGY

3.1

Conceptual Framework
We start this section by describing the conceptual framework underlying the model

proposed in this study. The conceptual framework depicted in Figure 3.7 fully captures
the vertical and horizontal structure of the geographically localized market that
constitutes the center of our analysis. There is an upstream agricultural sector that
produces two outputs, corn and soybeans. Corn is purchased by the livestock, food, and
ethanol sectors. Soybeans are purchased by the livestock and food sectors, but not by
ethanol plants. Corn and soybeans are substitutable in production so we explicitly
considered the input elasticity of substitution as a mediating factor in determining
equilibrium displacement. Exports are another source of demand, but that we consider
exogenous in our model. Since transportation costs to the export market is much higher,
exports receive the residual of the corn supply that is not absorbed at the local level. The
model starts by developing expressions for agricultural supply, and demand for
agricultural products from the processing sector. Market clearing conditions connect both
sides of the upstream market for agricultural products.
Moreover, the three processing sectors use agricultural inputs to produce three final
products that are sold to downstream customers. However, the model is a bit complicated
by the fact that the ethanol sector produces a byproduct (distillers’ grains or DGS) that
can be sold to the livestock sector, essentially to replace corn as feed. The food sector, on
the other hand, does not purchase DGS. We explicitly model supply and demand for food
and livestock sectors. Once again, market-clearing conditions connect both sides of the
market.
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Figure 3.7 Short Graphic Following Dashed Line for Equation Interaction

We have already documented the localized nature of corn procurement due to
transportation costs (Sexton, 2012) and corn procurement in particular (McNew and
Griffith, 2005; Saitone, Sexton, and Sexton, 2008; Jung, Sesmero, and Siebert, 2018). In
the context of localized markets, the ethanol sector differs from other corn purchasing
sectors in important ways. Corn demand from ethanol plants is very large relative to corn
supply within the relevant (local) market boundaries. Table 3.1 highlights this fact by
comparing the ratio of corn required by ethanol plants to total corn produced in the
county where the plant is located. This reveals that corn requirements by an individual
plant is typically much larger than corn production in the entire county where the plant is
located (ratios are well above one). This is not, however, the case for livestock and food
firms. Within local market boundaries, these sectors as a whole are typically smaller
(require less corn) than individual ethanol plants. In fact, the ratio for livestock as a
whole (sum of individual producers) averages about 0.25 in counties with livestock
production. The ratio for food millers as a whole is also typically well below 1. In
addition, since these sectors are also atomized, individual firms are simply not large
enough to influence price through their purchasing decisions; i.e. they do not individually
face upward sloping supply of corn and simply operate as price acceptant firms.
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Table 3.1 Ratio of Corn Demand by Ethanol Plants to Corn Production in selected
Counties in Indiana

Source: Jung (2018)

Given the aforementioned empirical features of local corn procurement markets,
we partition corn demand in demand from dominant firms (i.e. ethanol plants) and a
competitive fringe. Figure 3.8 clarifies our modeling strategy for corn procurement. We
depict the corn procurement market for the competitive fringe in the left panel of Figure
3.8, and the residual corn market for ethanol plants in the right panel. Total corn supply is
depicted by ܵ . A portion of that supply is absorbed by the competitive fringe at each
price. The ethanol plants then face the associated residual supply of corn, which is
depicted in the right panel by ܵ ݈ܽݑ݀݅ݏ݁ݎ. From that residual supply, we obtain a
marginal factor cost function ()ܥܨܯ. Finally, the marginal value product ( )ܸܲܯof corn
is determined by marginal product of corn times ethanol price. Since ethanol are price
takers in the output market, they face a flat  ܸܲܯline. We combine residual supply,
marginal factor cost, and marginal value product to determine the quantity of corn
purchased by the ethanol sector and price markdown; i.e. the difference between marginal
value product and residual supply at optimal quantity.
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Figure 3.8 shows equilibrium in the residual corn market for ethanol plants under
two levels of ܸܲܯ. The higher  ܸܲܯcaptures a subsidy on ethanol (or the tariffication of
the mandate; i.e. RIN price). The ethanol plant purchases corn up to the quantity where
its marginal value product equals marginal factor cost. The price of corn ultimately paid
by ethanol plants is depicted by the residual corn supply at that quantity. The increase in
 ܸܲܯincreases the quantity purchased from ܳ  to ܳ  , and also the price paid for


ଵ

corn from r0 to r1. The magnitude of the impact of the subsidy depends negatively on the
slope of the marginal factor cost line. Higher market power is associated with a steeper
marginal factor cost line and a smaller increase in corn demand and price from the
subsidy.

Figure 3.8 Corn Price Markdown by Ethanol Plants

3.2

A Model of Equilibrium Displacement with Multiple Interconnected Markets
We model a system with one upstream sector (agricultural producers), three

intermediate sectors (ethanol, livestock, and food), and corresponding downstream
demands for each one of these outputs. Each sector should be interpreted as an
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aggregation of multiple sub-sectors or individuals. Conditions for the existence of an
aggregate production technology (homogeneity and separability of sub-sectors) as
derived by Berndt and Christensen (1973), as well as conditions for existence of the dual
cost function as reviewed by Diewert (1982), are assumed to hold.
We represent the aggregate technology of the agricultural sector by the dual
multi-output (corn and soybean) cost function. We use a general specification that allows
for a range of returns to scale and substitutability patterns between corn and soybean. On
the input side, we assume that agricultural producers are price takers, and that the supply
of agricultural products, within the relevant geographical boundaries, is perfectly elastic.
This implies that equilibrium displacements at the local level are not relevant enough to
influence the price of inputs like fertilizer and seeds. The reason underlying this
assumption is that transportation costs in these markets are low enough relative to the
input’s price, so that the relevant geographical boundaries at which prices are determined
are much larger than the local market (perhaps regional or even national). Therefore,
demand for agricultural inputs is not explicitly modeled. Under the assumption of pricetaking behavior, the supply of agricultural products is characterized by the conventional
condition that marginal cost is equal to price:
ܥ௬ = ௦

(1)

ܥ௬್ = ௦

(2)

where ܥ௬ is the marginal cost of producing corn, ௦ is the price of corn received by
farmers, ܥ௬್ is the marginal cost of producing soybeans, and ௦ is the price of soybeans
received by farmers. It should be noted that, under constant returns to scale, this
condition collapses to the zero-profit condition widely used in partial equilibrium models
under perfect competition.
The livestock and food sectors purchase both corn and soybeans to produce their
outputs. The livestock sector is an aggregate of swine, beef, and poultry. The same is true
of the food sector, which includes both dry and wet milling processors, but we aggregate
them into one sector. The demand for agricultural crops from processors is characterized
by Shephard’s lemma in the context of a dual cost function:
ܥ௪ಽ = ݔ െ ߛܺ

(demand for corn from the livestock sector)

(3)
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ܥ௪ಷ = ݔி

(demand for corn from the food sector)

(4)

ܥ௪್ = ݔ

(demand for soybean from the livestock sector)

(5)

ܥ௪್ = ݔி

(demand for soybean from the food sector)

(6)

ಽ

ಷ

where ܥ௪ is the derivative of the cost of sector j (j = L if livestock and F if food) with
ೕ

respect to the price of input i (i = c if corn and b if soybean), and ݔ denotes the quantity
of input i (i = c if corn and b if soybean) purchased by sector j (j = L if livestock and F if
food). We have adjusted demand for corn to subtract distillers’ grains produced by
ethanol plants and directly sold to livestock producers. We follow previous literature (e.g.
Cui et al. 2011) and assume distillers’ grains are produced at a constant fraction ߛ of corn
used in ethanol production.
The supply of food and livestock is characterized by the typical equality between
marginal cost of production and the output price received by the producer:
ܥ௬ಽ = ௦

(7)

ܥ௬ಷ = ி௦

(8)

The demand for food and livestock can be written as:
ݕௗ = ݂ (ௗ )

(9)

ݕிௗ = ݂ி (ிௗ )

(10)

where livestock and food demand are denoted by ݕௗ and ݕிௗ respectively, ௗ represents
the price of livestock product paid by consumers, and ிௗ represents the price of food paid
by consumers. Demand functions for livestock and food products are generically
represented by ݂ (. ) and ݂ி (. ) respectively.
The ethanol sector differs from the livestock and food sectors in three important
ways. First, ethanol plants do not purchase soybean. Second, single firms in the ethanol
sector are large enough to face an upward sloping supply. Therefore, the optimizers will
differentiate between input supply and marginal factor cost. This is in contrast with the
livestock and food sectors in which individual firms are much smaller. In fact, a single
ethanol plant typically consumes more corn than all livestock and food producers in the
county where the plant is located, combined. Therefore, demand for corn by ethanol
plants do not follow the typical supply equals marginal value product condition (or its
dual version, equations 3-6). In turn, individual plants purchase corn until marginal factor
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cost (which may differ from supply) equals marginal value product. When multiple plants
operate within the boundaries of a local market, the mode of competition can vary from
Bertrand (intensive price competition) to monopsony (where plants can sustain full
collusion), including intermediate scenarios like Cournot competition.
The profit expression for i-th ethanol plant in an oligopsony setting is, ߎ =
௦ ݕ (ݔ ) െ ܲ (ݔ )ݔ െ ܴ , where ௦ is the output price received by the ethanol
producer, ݕ (ݔ ) is the production function mapping corn usage to ethanol production,
ܲ (ܺ ) is the inverse corn supply, and ܴ are fixed costs.
The plant will purchase corn according to the first order condition:
ୢ

ୢ௫ಲ

ୢ௬

ୢ ୢ 


= ௦ ୢ௫ಲ െ ୢ ୢ௫ ಲ ݔ
െ ܲ = 0
ಲ

ಲ

(11),

ಲ

ୢ 

where ୢ௫ಲ captures the behavioral reaction of competitors to the individual plant’s
ಲ

increase in corn procurement and ethanol production. We denote this parameter by ߐ, and
it represents the deviation between marginal factor cost and supply as depicted in Figure
3.9.
ߐ

ܲ

ܲ ଵ
ܲ 

ܳ 



ܳ 

ଵ

ܳ 

Figure 3.9 Parameter ߐ as a Wedge between Supply and Marginal Factor Cost

The conjectural elasticity ߐ represents the deviation from the competitive
benchmark at the industry level. The firm optimizes by setting the quantity of corn where
marginal value product (which is a constant if the conversion ratio is constant and
demand for ethanol is perfectly elastic) equals marginal factor cost. When ߐ = 0, the
equilibrium collapses to that of a perfectly competitive market since marginal factor cost
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is equal to supply. The firm purchases ܳ  and pays a price of ܲ ଵ . A raise in ߐ above
ଵ

zero mimics an increasing degree of collusive behavior and is, all else constant,
associated with lower corn purchases (for instance from ܳ  to ܳ  ) and lower corn
ଵ



price (from ܲ ଵ to ܲ  ). When ߐ = 1, the equilibrium collapses to that of a monopsony.
The third important way in which the ethanol sector differs from livestock and
food is that individual ethanol plants are price takers on the output side. Therefore, the
demand for ethanol, within the relevant geographical boundaries, is perfectly elastic. This
implies that equilibrium displacements at the local level are not relevant enough to
influence the price of ethanol. Once more, the reasoning underlying this assumption is
that transportation cost of ethanol is low relative to its price. Consequently, the price of
ethanol is determined at larger geographical boundaries and it is then exogenous in our
model.
Finally, the market-clearing conditions connect all endogenous variables. We
have equilibrium conditions for the livestock, food, corn, and soybean markets:
௦ െ ௗ = ߬

(12)

ி௦ െ ிௗ = ߬ி

(13)

௦ െ ௗ = ߬

(14)

௦ െ ௗ = ߬

(15)

௦ െ ௗ = ߬

(16)

where  is the price of product j (j = corn, soybean, ethanol) received by the supplier (if
k = s) or paid by the consumer (if k = d).
We now log-linearize the system around the equilibrium point so that
displacement can be fully described in terms of elasticities and exogenous variables (an
overview of steps can be found in Appendix A1 and B1). We do so by first totally
differentiating system (1)-(16). We then algebraically manipulate the system exploiting
three key identities. First, the percentage change in corn (soybean) supply is equal to the
weighted sum of corn (soybean) demand from livestock, food, and ethanol (ethanol is not
included in the soybeans market because it does not purchase soybeans) where the
weights are the share of each sector on total corn demand; i.e. ݈݀݊ݕ = (ݏ ݀ ln ݔ +
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ݏி ݀ ln ݔி + ݏ ݀ ln ݔ ) and ݈݀݊ݕ = ൫ݏ ݀ ln ݔ + ݏி ݀ ln ݔி ൯, where ݏ is the share
of sector ݆ in total purchases of crop ݅ within the market boundaries.
Second,
ௗ௬
௬

డ௬ ௫
డ௫ ௬

is the elasticity of some variable y with respect to its argument x. Thirdly,

is equal to ݈݀݊ݕ. The log-linear displacement model can be re-expressed, starting from

the agricultural sector supply, as follows:
ܧ௬ೞ ିଵ (݀ ln ݔ + ݀ ln ݔி + ݀ ln ݔ ) + ܧ௬್ ೞ ିଵ൫݀ ln ݔ + ݀ ln ݔி ൯ = dln௦

(1b)

ܧ௬್ ିଵ (݀ ln ݔ + ݀ ln ݔி + ݀ ln ݔ ) + ܧ௬್್ ିଵ ൫݀ ln ݔ + ݀ ln ݔி ൯ = dln௦

(2b)

where ܧ௬ೞ ିଵ is the inverse of the own-price elasticity of corn supply, ܧ௬್ೞ ିଵ is the
inverse of the elasticity of soybean supply with respect to the price of corn, ܧ௬್ ିଵ is the
inverse of the elasticity of corn supply with respect to the price of soybean, and ܧ௬್ ್ ିଵ
is the inverse of the own-price elasticity of soybean supply.
From demand for corn by livestock and food:
ܧ௫ಽ ௬ಽ ݀ ln ݕ + ܧ௫ಽ ݀ ln ௗ + ܧ௫   ݀ ln ௗ = ݀ ln ݔ െ ݏಲ௫ಽ ݈݀݊ܺ
ಽ ್

(3b)

where ܧ௫ಽ௬ಽ is the elasticity of corn demand by the livestock sector with respect to
output, ܧ௫ಽ is the own-price elasticity of corn demand by the livestock sector, ܧ௫   is
ಽ ್

the elasticity of corn demand by the livestock sector with respect to the price of soybeans.
Finally, ݏಲ௫ಽ (equal to

 ಲ
௫ಽ

) is the equilibrium ratio of DDGS to corn in livestock feed

ration.
ܧ௫ಷ ௬ಷ ݀ ln ݕி + ܧ௫   ݀ ln ௗ + ܧ௫   ݀ ln ௗ = ݀ ln ݔி
ಷ

(4b)

ಷ ್

where ܧ௫ಷ௬ಷ is the elasticity of corn demand by the food sector with respect to output,
ܧ௫ಷ  is the own-price elasticity of corn demand by the food sector, ܧ௫   is the
ಷ ್

elasticity of soybean demand by the food sector with respect to the price of soybean.
From demand for soybeans by livestock and food:
ܧ௫ ್ ௬ಽ ݀ ln ݕ + ܧ௫ ್ ݀ ln ௗ + ܧ௫ ್ ݀ ln ௗ = ݀ ln ݔ

(5b)

ܧ௫ ್ ௬ಷ ݀ ln ݕி + ܧ௫ ್ ݀ ln ௗ + ܧ௫ ್ ݀ ln ௗ = ݀ ln ݔி

(6b)

ಽ

ಷ

ಽ ್

ಷ ್

ಽ

ಷ
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where ܧ௫ ್௬ is the elasticity of soybean demand by sector ݇ with respect to output, ܧ௫ ್
ೖ ೖ

ೖ ್

is the own-price elasticity of soybean demand by sector ݇, ܧ௫ ್  is the elasticity of
ೖ 

soybean demand by sector ݇ with respect to the price of corn.
From supply of livestock:
ܧ௬ಽ ಽೞ ିଵ ݈݀݊ݕ + ܧ௬ಽ ିଵ ݈݀݊ௗ + ܧ௬ಽ ିଵ ݈݀݊ௗ = dln௦
್

(7b)

From supply of food:
ܧ௬ಷ ಷೞ ିଵ ݈݀݊ݕ + ܧ௬ಷ ିଵ ݈݀݊ௗ + ܧ௬


ಷ ್

ିଵ

݈݀݊ௗ = dlnி௦

(8b)

where ܧ௬ೖೖೞ ିଵ is the inverse of the elasticity of supply of sector ݇ with respect to output
price, ܧ௬ೖ  ିଵ is the inverse of the elasticity of supply of sector ݇ with respect to the
price of corn, and ܧ௬


ೖ ್

ିଵ

is the inverse of the elasticity of supply of sector ݇ with

respect to the price of soybeans.
From demand for livestock:
݀ ln ݕ = ܧ௬ௗಽಽ ݀ ln ௗ

(9b)

From demand for food:
݀ ln ݕி = ܧ௬ௗಷಷ ݀ ln ிௗ

(10b)

where ܧ௬ௗೖ ೖ is the own-price elasticity of demand for product ݇.
From ethanol first order condition, (a step-by-step derivation can be found in Appendix
B1):
ܧ௬ಲ௫ಲ  ݀ ݏln ௦ = ߐߟ௦ (ߦ + 1)݀ ln ݔ + ݀ ln ௗ

(11b)

where ߟ is the elasticity of ethanol supply with respect to corn usage, ߟ௦ is the own-price
elasticity of residual corn supply faced by the ethanol plant 3, ߦ is the elasticity of the
slope of the residual corn supply function with respect to corn usage (which captures the
convexity of the residual corn supply), and ߐ is the conjectural variation elasticity
defined before.
From market clearing conditions:

3

݀ ln ௗ െ ݀ ln ௦ = ݀߬

(12b)

݀ ln ிௗ െ ݀ ln ி௦ = ݀߬ி

(13b)

Which does not coincide with the own-price elasticity of aggregate corn supply unless demand
for corn from livestock and food are perfectly inelastic.
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݀ ln ௦ െ ݀ ln ௗ = ݀߬

(14b)

݀ ln ௦ െ ݀ ln ௗ = ݀߬

(15b)

 ௬ ௦௦௨௧

݀ ln ௦ െ

ᇩ
ᇪᇭ
ௗ
݀ᇭln
ᇫ


= ݀߬

(16b)

This is a system of 16 equations on 16 unknowns (percentage change of 9 prices and 7
quantities): ௗ , ௦ , ௗ , ௦ , ௗ , ௦ , ிௗ , ி௦ , ௦ , ݕ , ݕி , ݔ , ݔ , ݔி , ݔ , and ݔி . The
equilibrium displacement is triggered by one or more of 5 exogenous shocks: ݀߬ , ݀߬ி ,
݀߬ , ݀߬ , and ݀߬ . The nature and magnitude of the displacement is shaped by the
primitives of the model, including supply and demand elasticities (scale elasticities as
well as own- and cross-price elasticities), equilibrium shares and ratios, and the
conjectural variation elasticity. We impose the appropriate cross-elasticity constraints,
which are derived from the properties of the cost function. Finally, given the perfectly
elastic demand for ethanol, the quantity of ethanol is directly determined by the quantity
of corn purchased and processed by the ethanol sector: ݀ ln ݕ = ܧ௬ಲ௫ಲ ݀ ln ݔ , where
ܧ௬ಲ௫ಲ is the elasticity of ethanol supply with respect to corn usage.
An overview of the entire system can be found in Table 3.2. Similarly, a
description of the vector of endogenous variables is presented in Table 3.3. These tables
not only help us keep track of the entire model, but also highlight the equality between
the number of equations and the number of endogenous variables. This equality
guarantees existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and, by extension, it also guarantees
uniqueness of equilibrium displacement.
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Table 3.2 A Compact Summary of the System, Overview
Description

Input Supply

Eq. Label

Represents

Description

(1)

Corn Supply

Corn Production
Quantity

ܥ௬ = ௦

(2)

Soybean
Supply

Soybean Production
Quantity

ܥ௬್ = ௦

(3)

Corn
Demanded by
the Livestock
Industry

Demand for Corn from
the Livestock Sector

ܥ௪ಽ = ݔ െ ߛܺ

(4)

Corn
Demanded by
the Food
Industry

Demand for Corn from
the Food Sector

ܥ௪ಷ = ݔி

(5)

Corn
Demanded by
the Livestock
Industry

Demand for Soybean
from the Livestock
Sector

ܥ௪ ್ = ݔ

(6)

Corn
Demanded by
the Food
Industry

Demand for Soybean
from the Food Sector

ܥ௪ ್ = ݔி

(7)

Livestock
Supply

Livestock Output

ܥ௬ಽ = ௦

(8)

Food Products
Supply

Food Products
Produced

ܥ௬ಷ = ி௦

(9)

Livestock
Demand

Animal Products
Quantity Demanded

ݕௗ = ݂ (ௗ )

Food Demand

Food Products Quantity
Demanded

ݕிௗ = ݂ி (ிௗ )

Optimal Input

MC = Price

Demands

(10)

Expression

ಽ

ಷ

26
Table 3.2 continued
Demand for Corn from
the Ethanol Sector

(12)

Livestock
Wedge

Equilibrium

௦ െ ௗ = ߬

(13)

Food Wedge

Equilibrium

ி௦ െ ிௗ = ߬ி

(14)

Corn Wedge

Equilibrium

௦ െ ௗ = ߬

(15)

Soybean
Wedge

Equilibrium

௦ െ ௗ = ߬

(16)

Ethanol Wedge

Policy Induced Shock

௦ െ ௗ = ߬

Optimal Input

Input and Output
Wedges:
Equilibrium
Conditions

dߎ

dݔ

Corn
Demanded by
the Ethanol
Industry

(11)

dݕ

dݔ
dܲ dܺ 
െ   ݔ
െ ܲ
dܺ dݔ
=0
= ௦
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Table 3.3 List of Endogenous Variables in the System
Endogenous From Expression
Variable

Description

Change
Represented

yL

Livestock Demand

$QLPDO3URGXFWVRQWKH0DUNHWǻ

݀ ln y

yF

Food Demand

)RRG3URGXFWVRQWKH0DUNHWǻ

݀ ln y

ௗ

Corn Demand

'HPDQG3ULFHRI&RUQǻ

݀ ln ܿ݀

௦

Corn Supply

6XSSO\3ULFHRI&RUQǻ

݀ ln ܿݏ

ௗ

Soybean Demand

'HPDQG3ULFHRI6R\EHDQǻ

݀ ln ܾ݀

௦

Soybean Supply

6XSSO\3ULFHRI6R\EHDQǻ

݀ ln ܾݏ

ௗ

Livestock Demand

'HPDQG3ULFHRI/LYHVWRFNǻ

݀ ln ܮ݀

௦

Livestock Supply

6XSSO\3ULFHRI/LYHVWRFNǻ

݀ ln ܮݏ

ிௗ

Food Demand

'HPDQG3ULFHRI)RRGǻ

݀ ln ܨ݀

ி௦

Food Supply

6XSSO\3ULFHRI)RRGǻ

݀ ln ܨݏ

௦

Ethanol Supply

6XSSO\3ULFHRI(WKDQROǻ

݀ ln ܣݏ

ݔ

FOC for Ethanol
Demand for Corn

4XDQWLW\RI&RUQLQ(WKDQROǻ

݀ ln ܣܿݔ

ݔ

Livestock demand
and Corn Demand

Quantity of Corn in Livestock, ǻ

݀ ln ܮܿݔ

ݔி

Food Demand and
Corn Demand

4XDQWLW\RI&RUQLQ)RRGǻ

݀ ln ܨܿݔ

ݔ

Livestock Demand
and Soyb. Demand

4XDQWLW\RI6R\EHDQLQ/LYHVWRFNǻ

݀ ln ܮܾݔ

ݔி

Food Demand and
Soybean Demand

4XDQWLW\RI6R\EHDQLQ)RRGǻ

݀ ln ܨܾݔ

Total

16 Equations

16 Unknowns
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A key advantage of the log-linear system is that it allows simple calculation and
decomposition of the welfare effects of policy shocks. In the context of perfectly
competitive industries, the welfare effects of equilibrium displacement in a specific sector
are proportional to the initial equilibrium allocation  ݕ (Perrin, 1997). Changes in
welfare in competitive market ݇ can be expressed as:
ǻLQFRQVXPHU EX\HUGHPDQGHU ZHOIDUH= െ݀ ݈݊ ௗ ൬1 +
ǻLQSURGXFHU VHOOHUVXSSOLHU ZHOIDUH= ቂ݀ ln ௦ ቀ1 +

ௗ ୪୬ ௬ೖೞ
ଶ

ௗ  ௬ೖ
ଶ

൰൨  ݕ

ቁቃ  ݕ

(18)
(19)

Equations (18) and (19) show that changes in consumer and producer surplus will
be symmetric in the absence of wedges between the price paid by consumers of product ݇
and the price received by producers. It also shows that producer surplus in sector ݇ can
increase even if a reduction in the production of ݇ takes place, if such reduction in
equilibrium quantity is sufficiently compensated by an increase in equilibrium price.
Profit change for ethanol sector takes a different route.
Calculation of welfare effects is another aspect in which the ethanol sector differs
from other sectors in our model. Since the ethanol market is not perfectly competitive
(except in the specific case when the conjectural variation parameter is equal to zero), the
welfare change of the ethanol sector is simply the percentage change in profits (which are
positive due to markdown on the price of corn). In particular, the welfare change in the
ethanol sector can be expressed as:
݈݀݊ߨ = ݏగ (݈݀݊ݕ + ݈݀݊ ) + ݏగ (݈݀݊ݔ + ݈݀݊ )

(20)

where ݏగ is the ratio of ethanol revenues to profit, ݏగ is the ratio of corn expenses to
profit, and the rest are endogenous displacements from the solution of the log-linear
model.
The entire system can be expressed in matrix notation as follows:
ܧ௬ ೖ ିଵ

െܫ

0

0

0

െܫ

0

ܧ௫   

0

0

െܫ

0

ܧ௫ ್  

0

0

0

0

െܫ

0

0
0

0
0

0
0

ܧ௬ௗೕ ೕ
െܫ,
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ۑ

ۑ
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ۑ
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 ێ ۑ ۑ
ௗ
݀ ln  ۑ
ێۑ ܫ

 ݀ ۏ ۑln ݕ  ۏ ے, ے
0 ے

(21)
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Quantitative analysis with this model proceeds in three steps. First, we populate the
matrix of elasticities with their corresponding values. Second, we insert values
corresponding to policy shocks (i.e. populating vector , ). Finally, we solve for the
displacement of endogenous variables by pre-multiplying both sides of system (21) by
the inverse of the matrix of elasticities (see Appendix B2). In other words:
ܧ௬ ೖ ିଵ
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 ێ ۑ
ێ
ۑ
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(22)

The next section explains the parameterization of the matrix of elasticities.

3.3

Model Parameterization
A complete list of short-run elasticities is presented in Table 3.4. Elasticity values

are obtained from a wide range of published estimates. The existence of such a broad
range of elasticity estimates reflects the vastness and importance of this literature. Table
3.4 reports not only the values assumed in our counterfactual policy simulations, but also
the specific source from which each value was obtained. Some values reported in Table
3.4, like corn and soybeans own-price supply and demand elasticities vary widely across
geographical regions (FAPRI, 2018). Therefore, it is important to acknowledge the
relatively limited external validity of quantitative conclusions in this thesis. Qualitative
insights delivered by our analysis are, however, much more generalizable. We have tried
however to use the latest and most up to date set of estimates reported in Hochman and
Zilberman (2018).

30
Table 3.4 Elasticity Values of Inputs and Outputs in the System
Notation Description

ܧ௬ೞ ିଵ

3

Inverse: supply elasticity of price of corn.
Directly associated in the system
with ݀ ln ݔ and ݀ ln ௦ .

Value

Source(s)’ estimates
Literature
3.509 Hochman and
Zilberman (2018)
Drabik et al. (2016)
Cui et al. (2011)

ܧ௬್ೞ ିଵ
ܧ௬್ ିଵ
ܧ௬್್ ିଵ
ܧ௫ಽ ௬ಽ
ܧ௫ಽ 
ܧ௫   
ಽ ್

ݏಲ ௫ಽ
ܧ௫ಷ ௬ಷ
ܧ௫ಷ 
ܧ௫  
ಷ ್

ܧ௫ ್ ௬ಽ
ಽ

ܧ௫ ್  
ಽ ್

ܧ௫ ್ 
ಽ

Inverse: supply elasticity of price of soybeans
with respect to corn. Directly associated in
the system with ݀ ln ݔ and ݀ ln ௦ .
Inverse: supply elasticity of price of corn
with respect to soybeans. Directly associated
in the system with ݀ ln ݔ and ݀ ln ௦ .
Inverse: supply elasticity of price of
soybeans. Directly associated in the system
with ݀ ln ݔ and ݀ ln ௦ .
Corn price elasticity of demand with respect
to livestock. Directly associated in the system
with ݀ ln ݕ .
Corn price elasticity of demand. Directly
associated in the system with ݀ ln ௗ .
Corn price elasticity of demand with respect
to soybeans. Directly associated in the system
with ݀ ln ௗ .
Ratio of DDGS to corn in livestock feed
ration.
Corn price elasticity of demand with respect
to food. Directly associated in the system
with ݀ ln ݕி .
Corn price elasticity of demand. Directly
associated in the system with ݀ ln ௗ .
Corn price elasticity of demand with respect
to soybeans. Directly associated in the system
with ݀ ln ௗ .
Soybean price elasticity of demand with
respect to livestock. Directly associated in the
system with ݀ ln ݕ .
Soybean price elasticity of demand. Directly
associated in the system with ݀ ln ௗ .
Soybean price elasticity of demand with
respect to corn price. Directly associated in
the system with ݀ ln ௗ .

7.692 Hochman et al. (2012)

13.158 Hochman et al. (2012)

4.000 Dhoubhadel (2015)

-0.910

Gardner (2007)

-0.530 Hochman and
Zilberman (2018)
0.123 Hochman et al. (2012)

0.480 Arora et al. (2008)
-0.014 Vittetoe (2009)

-0.530 Hochman and
Zilberman (2018)
0.123 Hochman et al. (2012)

0.310 Suh and Moss (2017)

-0.143 Suh and Moss (2017)
0.027 Hochman et al. (2012)
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Table 3.4 continued
 ܧ௫ ್ ௬ಷ
ಷ

ܧ௫ ್  
ಷ ್

ܧ௫ ್ 
ಷ

ܧ௬ಽ ಽೞ ିଵ
ܧ௬ಽ ିଵ
ܧ௬ಽ ିଵ
್

ܧ௬ಷ ಷೞ ିଵ
ܧ௬ಷ ିଵ
ܧ௬ಷ ିଵ
್

ܧ௬ௗಽಽ
ܧ௬ௗಷಷ

Soybean price elasticity of demand with
respect to food. Directly associated in the
system with ݀ ln ݕி .
Soybean price elasticity of demand. Directly
associated in the system with ݀ ln ௗ .
Soybean price elasticity of demand with
respect to corn price. Directly associated in
the system with ݀ ln ௗ .
Inverse: supply elasticity of price of
livestock. Directly associated in the system
with ݀ ln ݕ .
Inverse: supply elasticity of price of livestock
with respect to corn. Directly associated in
the system with ݀ ln ௗ .
Inverse: supply elasticity of price of livestock
with respect to soybeans. Directly associated
in the system with ݀ ln ௗ .
Inverse: supply elasticity of price of food.
Directly associated in the system
with ݀ ln ݕி .
Inverse: supply elasticity of price of food
with respect to corn. Directly associated in
the system with ݀ ln ௗ .
Inverse: supply elasticity of price of food
with respect to soybeans. Directly associated
in the system with ݀ ln ௗ .
Livestock price elasticity of demand. Directly
associated in the system with ݀ ln ௗ .
Food price elasticity of demand. Directly
associated in the system with ݀ ln ிௗ .

ߟ

Ethanol output response in relation to corn as
an input.

ߐ

Deviation from the competitive benchmark at
the industry level.

ݏ

Rationalized share of ethanol in relation to
corn.2
Corn price elasticity of supply.

ߟ௦

0.250 Author’s assumption

-0.143 Suh and Moss (2017)
0.027 Hochman et al. (2012)

7.143 Ospina and Shumway
(1979)
-4.000 Ospina and Shumway
(1979)
-2.000 Suh and Moss (2017)

9.804 Roberts and Schlenker
(2013)
5.128 Vittetoe (2009)

-2.000 Author’s assumption

-0.436 Paarlberg et al. (2002)
-0.215 Drabik et al. (2016)
Cui et al. (2011)
1.000 Author’s calculation
(theoretical)
[0,1]

Author’s calculation
(theoretical)

1.072 Author’s calculation2
0.285 Hochman and
Zilberman (2018)
Drabik et al. (2016)
Cui et al. (2011)
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Table 3.4 continued
ߦ is the percentage change in the slope of the
corn supply function. ߯ represents the
ୢ
corresponding change  in the following

ߦ

expression:

ܧ௬ಲ௫ಲ

ୢቀ

ౚು
ቁ
ౚೂ

ୢொ

1.500 Author’s calculation
(theoretical)

ୢொ

. Impact of policy induced

shock.
Ethanol price elasticity of supply.

0.241 Luchansky and Monks
(2009)

1

Elasticity information interaction is in the setup of expression (20) of section 3.2. Equivalent
equation number, number of variables with the above table, and ݀߬ wedges are interacting in a
matrix layout. The complete matrix can be seen in Appendix B2.
2
The value for the  ݏestimate is calculated with the following parameters and manner: knowing
ொ 
that  = ݏொ   , a medium sized ethanol processing plant has a capacity of around 100 million
 

gallons of ethanol production. For such output, the plant requires about 35.7 million bushels of
corn as per the 2.8 gallons of ethanol estimate per bushel of corn. At an average price of ethanol
of $1.49 per gallon, and an average price of corn of $3.89 a bushel, the calculate ratio with these
values come up to 1.072. Please note that some of these values are low (e.g. $1.49/gal. ethanol
price in 2018, but near $2.50/gal. in 2013), but they benchmark just one year – throughout the
years, ethanol price, corn price, and other technology constantly changes, which can yield higher
or lower s estimate, but close to the 1.1 mark.
3

ଵ
ఎ

,QYHUVHHODVWLFLW\YDOXHVVKRZQ7KDWLVLIZHKDYHDQHODVWLFLW\RIȘWKHQ = ቀ

essence give us

%ο
.
%οொ

ொ  ିଵ
ቁ
 ொ

will in

What percentage change in price is needed to achieve a 1% increase in

quantity.

The main source of model flexibility is provided by the conjectural variation
elasticity ࣄ. Instead of using a point estimate for this elasticity, our analysis simulates
ethanol policy under a range of market structure counterfactuals, captured by different
values of ࣄ. This exercise delivers generalizable qualitative insights that constitute a key
contribution of this thesis. Our simulations reveal how market power mediates the
welfare effects of ethanol policies; both the overall welfare effect and the distribution of
policy-induced rents. Conduct in the ethanol industry not only affects the distribution of
rents along the vertical supply chain, but also has crucial impacts on horizontal spillovers
associated with ethanol policy.
The welfare analysis is conducted with respect to an initial equilibrium allocation.
The initial equilibrium values were obtained from a combination of sources and are
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composed of average values from the 2016/17 marketing year. Ethanol related data were
obtained from the Economic Research Service within the USDA (2018). For livestock,
production and consumption values were taken for 2016/17 in dollars per hundredweight
($/cwt), wholesale prices (mainly beef, pork, and lamb values). Data from the food sector
reflects dollar per bushel of grain converted into human breakfast cereal and similarly
derived foods using corn and soy. For instance, the sweeteners made from corn are found
in many foods that people consume in the U.S. Furthermore, corn syrup, soybean oil, soy
protein isolate, and similar, are used as ingredients to a variety of food products. Finally,
average corn price in the study region was $3.36/bu. in the 2016/2017 marketing year.
Supply was 16.94 billion bushels and demand amounted to 14.65 billion bushels.
The ethanol policy is captured by the ethanol price wedge, ݀߬ . For instance, a
25% ethanol price subsidy is captured by ݀߬ = 0.25. This wedge has varied
dramatically over the years as reported in Figure 3.10. This figure reports average wedges
or differences between ethanol price paid by consumers and received by producers. As
revealed by Figure 3.10, this wedge has ranged from about 16% to almost 85% of the
baseline ethanol price.
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Data Source: ERS, USDA
Figure 3.10 Ethanol Price Wedge and Blending Credits as Percentage of Ethanol Price,
Historical (1982 to 2012)
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RESULTS

4.1

Policy Simulation
During most of the ethanol boom the subsidy of about 40 cents per gallon amounted

to a 25% of ethanol price, over average. Therefore, we simulate a 25% subsidy. We first
examine the equilibrium displacement associated with such subsidy and then its welfare
implications. The equilibrium displacement is fully characterized by the percentage
change of all 16 endogenous variables in our model. These percentage changes are then
directly used to calculate welfare implications according to equations (18) and (19). On
the other hand, welfare change of the ethanol sector is calculated based on equation (20).
We simulate this policy under the polar cases of perfect competition ࣄ = 0 and
monopsony competition ࣄ = 1. Simulation of this policy under polar cases of market
conduct provides important insights on the mediating effect of market power on the
effects of policy.
4.1.1

Equilibrium Displacement with Perfect Competition (GĲA = 0.25 and ࣄ = 0)
The percentage changes in endogenous variables are reported in Figure 4.11. The

policy re-directs corn away from the food (-3.8%) and livestock (-2.4%) sectors, and
towards the ethanol sector (+8%). On the other hand, the food and livestock sectors
substitute soybean for corn. The former increases soybean purchases by 2.4% and the
latter by 1.9%. Consequently, the price of soybeans increases by 3.8%. This substitution
does not fully offset the reduction in corn usage and results in a decrease in food
production by 1.7% and in livestock production by 2.9%. In turn, this results in an
increase in the price of food by 7.7% and an increase in the price of livestock in 6.6%.

Endogenous Variable
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Figure 4.11 Change in Endogenous Variables in Response to Policy under Perfect
Competition (i.e. ݀߬ = 0.25 and ߐ = 0)

Under the assumption of perfectly elastic ethanol demand, the subsidy directly
increases the price received by the ethanol producer by 25%. This results in an increase in
corn usage and ethanol production by about 8%. As a result, the price of corn increases
by 2.7%. Therefore, the policy is relatively effective in that the subsidy does result in a
sizable increase in ethanol production, as well as increases in farm revenue as revealed by
increases in the price of both corn and soybeans. We now proceed to analyze the welfare
implications of this equilibrium displacement.
4.1.2

:HOIDUH(IIHFWVRI3ROLF\ZLWK3HUIHFW&RPSHWLWLRQ GĲA = 0.25 and ࣄ = 0)

Changes in producer surplus associated with the equilibrium displacement shown in
the previous section are reported in Figure 4.12. This figure reports changes for all
endogenous sectors in our model. It should be noted that, since no price distortions are
considered in non-ethanol markets, changes in consumer surplus are simply the negative
of changes in producer surplus. On the other hand, since demand for ethanol is perfectly
elastic, the change in consumer surplus in the ethanol sector is zero by construction.
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WELFARE INCREASE / DECREASE IN %
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6.487%

3.861%
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2.711%
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SOYBEANS

SECTOR

Figure 4.12 Percent Changes in Consumer and Producer Welfare as dʏA Takes Value of
0.25 with ߐ = 0
Figure 4.12 reveals shows increases in surplus in the ethanol sector. It also shows
gains for the agricultural sector; i.e. corn and soybean producers. These results are not
surprising. But what it is perhaps surprising is the gains in producers’ surplus for both the
livestock and food sectors. However, careful examination of the formulas for producer
welfare (equations 18 and 19) reveals that producer surplus tends to increase if a
reduction in equilibrium quantity is outweighed by a sufficiently large increase in
equilibrium price. This is exactly the case for these sectors as shown in Figure 4.11. The
reason behind a substantial change in price relative to quantity becomes apparent when
we examine supply and demand elasticities for food and livestock in Table 3.4, both
sectors have relatively inelastic supply and demand curves. If demand is inelastic, upward
shifts in supply can have a larger impact on prices than on quantities, especially if supply
is itself inelastic. Therefore, while it has been widely asserted that ethanol policies would
impose negative spillovers on horizontally related markets such as livestock and food,
our analysis suggests otherwise.
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4.1.3

(TXLOLEULXP'LVSODFHPHQWZLWK,PSHUIHFW&RPSHWLWLRQ GĲA = 0.25 and ࣄ = 1)

The percentage changes in endogenous variables are reported in Figure 4.13. The
mediating effects of market power on ethanol policies are easy to elucidate from a visual
comparison between Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.13. Essentially the qualitative effects of the
ethanol policy remain the same under market power. However, the changes are
quantitatively much smaller. An ethanol subsidy under perfect competition increases corn
purchased for ethanol by 8%. For a monopsony in the ethanol industry, corn demand
from the ethanol sector only increases by 2.6%. The quantity of corn diverted away from
food and livestock is 1.2% and 0.7% respectively, compared to 4% and 2.4% under
perfect competition.
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Figure 4.13 Change in Endogenous Variables in Response to Policy under Perfect
Competition (i.e. ݀߬ = 0.25 and ߐ = 1)
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Therefore, while the policy does increase the marginal value product of corn for
ethanol, corn ethanol plants with buying power restrict corn demand and mark the price
of corn down, relative to the perfect competition case. In fact, the price of corn under
monopsony increases by 0.8%, as opposed to the 2.7% increase under perfect
competition. A similar pattern is observed in soybeans. This reduction in corn demand
relieves pressure on feedstock cost faced by the food and livestock industries.
Consequently, ethanol production only increases by 2.5% in the presence of market
power; which is small in comparison with the 8% increase in ethanol production in the
absence of market power. While at first glance a drastic reduction in corn producer under
a subsidy with a fixed ethanol price may suggest a declining surplus, a closer look
demonstrates otherwise. We now turn our attention to the welfare effects of the ethanol
policy under imperfect competition.
4.1.4

Welfare Effects of Policy with Imperfect Competition GĲ A = 0.25 and ࣄ =1)
Since the nature (direction) of equilibrium displacement is not altered by the

presence of market power, it is not surprising to note that the sign of welfare changes by
sector remain the same. However, a number of changes in welfare distribution do take
place that deserve careful consideration. Changes in sectoral welfare are reported in
Figure 4.14.
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Figure 4.14 3HUFHQW&KDQJHVLQ&RQVXPHUDQG3URGXFHU:HOIDUHDVGĲA Takes Value of
0.25 with ߐ = 1
First, policy-induced welfare gains by the ethanol sector increase from 3.4% to
3.6%. This does not seem like a substantial increase. However, this small increase in
rents seems to have substantial impacts on interconnected markets. First, corn and
soybean producers gain substantially less (less than half) from the ethanol policy when
ethanol plants have market power. The livestock and food sectors are still benefited by
policy under imperfect competition. However, their gains are also less than half those
under perfect competition.
These findings suggest, contrary to prior expectations, that a more competitive
ethanol industry favors both horizontally and vertically connected markets. However, the
more it helps producer surplus in these markets, the more it hurts consumer surplus. It is
also important to note that, since there is no consumer surplus for ethanol, the parametric
conditions that favor ethanol the most, are also going to be the conditions that maximize
policy-induced rents. Note, however, that this study does not incorporate the cost to the
taxpayer of maintaining the ethanol policy. Therefore, our evaluations are entirely done
on the policy-induced rents, not the overall efficiency or Paretian desirability of the
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policy itself. Comparisons between consumer and producer surplus are reported in Table
4.5.
Table 4.5 shows that ethanol policies increase overall welfare among the sectors
explicitly modeled in our analysis for the whole range of ethanol market conduct.
However, it also reveals that consumer surplus suffers a relatively drastic reduction.
Therefore, the ethanol subsidy benefits the production sector, but certainly not final
consumers of food and livestock. Moreover, results in Table 4.5 also shows that buying
power by ethanol plants limits overall increase in producer welfare. However, it reduces
losses in consumer welfare even more. Therefore, buying power in the ethanol sector can
lead to an increase in overall welfare.

Table 4.5 Total Surplus Comparison between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, 25% Ethanol
Wedge Change
Increase in overall
consumer welfare
Increase in overall
producer welfare

сϬ
-20.66%
сϬ
24.13%

сϭ
-6.45%
сϭ
10.08%

4.2

for
when
ĚʏA

25.00%

equals

Total welfare
improvement

Values

3.4777%

3.6311%

to

Interactions between Policy and Market Conduct
Our analysis so far has demonstrated that market conduct in the ethanol industry

is a crucial factor shaping the effects of ethanol policies along the vertical and horizontal
margins of the supply chain. We now turn our attention to the mediating role of conduct
under different subsidy levels. Conversely, we examine the effect of a subsidy under
different market conducts. Here, in essence, we are conducting a second order
comparative statics exercise.
Figure 4.15 reports changes in consumer surplus associated with multiple levels
of ethanol subsidy, under multiple conduct scenarios. This figure reveals that ethanol
subsidies always reduce consumer welfare within the boundaries of our geographically
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localized market. The higher the subsidy, the lower the overall level of consumer welfare.
However, this figure also reveals that market power can partially alleviate this negative
effect. Perhaps more strikingly, the alleviating effect of marker power grows with the size
of the ethanol subsidy. This is particularly true for consumers of food and livestock
products.
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Figure 4.15 3HUFHQW&KDQJHVLQ&RQVXPHU:HOIDUHIRU9DULDEOH/HYHOVRIWKH:HGJHGĲA
with ߐ = 0 and ߐ = 0.75

The reverse seems to be true on the producers’ surplus side. Patterns revealed in
Figure 4.16 suggest that food and livestock greatly benefit from increasing ethanol
subsidies. However, results in Figure 4.16 also show that those benefits are drastically
reduced by buying power in the ethanol sector. In fact, ethanol is the only sector
benefited by market power. Therefore, results in Figure 4.15 and Figure 4.16 seem to
suggest that the overall welfare effect of market power is ambiguous. On the one hand, it
reduces welfare losses sustained by consumers as a result of the ethanol subsidy. On the
other hand, it reduces welfare gains by producers. Inspection of results in Figure 4.15 and
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Figure 4.16 indicates that, overall, market power increases welfare gains from ethanolsupport policies at every level of the subsidy.
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Figure 4.16 3HUFHQW&KDQJHVLQ3URGXFHU:HOIDUHIRU9DULDEOH/HYHOVRIWKH:HGJHGĲA
with ߐ = 0 and ߐ = 0.75

4.2.1

Welfare Implications for the Livestock and Food Sectors
The livestock sector has multiple points of contact with the ethanol sector. First, it

competes with the ethanol sector for corn. Second, it purchases distillers’ grains from the
ethanol sector. Third, it consumes soybeans, which competes with corn for land.
Therefore, displacements in the ethanol industry will have complex and important
consequences for livestock. While spillovers from ethanol to livestock have been
documented in the previous section, we here focus our attention on the changes in
livestock equilibrium quantity and its welfare implications.
Figure 4.17A shows that corn purchased by the livestock sector decreases as the
ethanol subsidy increases. The reduction in livestock supply, however, is larger than the
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reduction in corn purchased by livestock. This is explained by increased cost of other
important feedstocks. Though not shown in Figure 4.17, ethanol subsidies also increase
soybean prices, further decreasing livestock supply and equilibrium quantity. Such
reduction in livestock supply are associated with increases in producer welfare. As shown
in Figure 4.17B, the larger the reduction in quantity, the larger the gain in producer
surplus.
Both panels of Figure 4.17 reveal that buying power in the ethanol sector softens
the output-decreasing effect of ethanol policies and reduces producer surplus for the
livestock sector. Therefore, reductions in market power in the ethanol sector are
beneficial for the livestock sector. Figure 4.17 also reveals that the benefits from
increased competition in the ethanol sector grow with the size of the ethanol subsidy.
This latest observation can be stated based on the increasing wedge between welfare with
perfect competition and imperfect competition.
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Figure 4.17 A) Equilibrium Displacement of Corn Purchased by the Livestock Sector and
Livestock Production; B) Change in Livestock Production and Producer Surplus

Although to a different degree, the results just discussed for the livestock sector
carry over to the food industry. Figure 4.18 shows that market power in the ethanol sector
is detrimental to the food sector. This is because it softens competition for corn, which
lessens the upward shift in food supply and averts large increases in output prices that
would have otherwise occurred.
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Figure 4.18 A) Equilibrium Displacement of Corn Purchased by the Food Sector and
Food Production; B) Change in Food Production and Producer Surplus

4.2.2 Welfare Implications for Corn and Soybean Producers
Changes in ethanol subsidy have a sizable impact on corn market equilibrium.
First, as the subsidy increases, more corn is allocated to ethanol and less corn is allocated
to food and livestock. Second, this is associated with an increase in corn price. More
importantly, the participation of ethanol in corn purchases is weakened by market power.
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Therefore, market power alleviates competitive pressure for corn among processors. This
lessens the impact of ethanol subsidies on corn price, as also revealed by Figure 4.19.
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Figure 4.19 Change in Corn Traded by Destination Sector and Producer Surplus

The subsidy to ethanol increases corn price because it increases the demand for
corn. In the absence of market power and with a subsidy of 50% the increase in corn
price is over 5%. But in the presence of considerable market power (ࣄ=0.75) the price
increase is only about 2%. The wedge between price increases introduced by market
power is much smaller, however, at lower subsidy levels. Values in Figure 4.19 also
reveal that, at any given subsidy, the gain in producer surplus by corn farmers is smaller
under market power than it would have been in the perfectly competitive equilibrium.
Finally, Figure 4.20 illustrates the feedstock substitution effect associated with
changes in ethanol subsidy. This figure depicts the growing shares of soybeans into the
livestock and food markets after the subsidy is introduced and increased by the
government. For reasons similar to the ones just discussed, the gain in producer surplus
for soybean producers is less under market than in the perfectly competitive benchmark.
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Figure 4.20 Percent Changes of the Quantities of Soybeans Going into each Sector and
Soybean Producer Price Percent Changes under Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium
versus Market Power Case; for Different Levels in Percentage of the Ethanol Wedge

4.2.3

Ethanol Sector Welfare Implications
The mediating role of market power on policy-induced change in production,

input demand, and producer surplus reverses completely in the ethanol sector relative to
the food and livestock sectors. Market power mitigates the positive effect of ethanol
subsidy on corn demand and, consequently, on ethanol production. However, it magnifies
the positive impact of the ethanol subsidy on ethanol producer surplus.
Market power is beneficial to ethanol plants because it allows them to extract
more rents from other sectors in the economy. Looking at Figure 4.19 and Figure 4.20, it
is clear that ethanol extracts rents from all other sectors in this local market. In particular,
market power substantially reduces gains in producer surplus from the ethanol subsidy
for agricultural producers, food processors, and livestock producers.
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As seen from Figure 4.21A, having a certain degree of flexibility in terms of
market power, meaning buying corn, the ethanol producers can experiment with different
outputs for best profit generation. The market power may be beneficial to the ethanol
producers in terms that it can mitigate the negative effects on output and the input needed
when market pressures are on. In addition, Figure 4.21B illustrates the welfare
implications and it can be seen that the ethanol outputs and welfares in both scenarios
follow fairly close to each other. For the effects, consider the following: when the wedge
has for instance increased from 5% to 25%, the ethanol sellers’ welfare has gone up from
0.72% to 3.60% at the theta 0.75 level. The lines here follow the similar pattern as before
with mitigating effects from the market power side.
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Figure 4.21 A) Equilibrium Displacement of Corn Purchased by the Ethanol Sector and
Ethanol Production; B) Change in Ethanol Production and Producer Surplus
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CONCLUDING REMARKS

5.1

Conclusions
The overwhelming majority of the literature examining the effect of ethanol

polices on agricultural and non-agricultural markets has focused its attention on globalor national-level markets. Yet, substantial evidence points to the fact that corn
procurement markets are geographically localized. This, in combination with the large
size of ethanol plants relative to corn supply within the relevant geographical boundaries,
challenges the widely held assumption that ethanol plants are price-takers in the corn
market. In this thesis, I develop a model of equilibrium displacement and combine it with
a conjectural variations framework to examine the effects of ethanol policies and the
mediating role of oligopsony market power on such effects. I conduct comparative statics
along two dimensions. First, equilibrium displacement and welfare implications of
ethanol policies. Second, we examine how those effects vary as the degree of oligopsony
power changes. The latter essentially constitutes a second order, system-level derivative.
This is because we examine how changes in oligopsony power change the response of
the system to the policy shock. This modeling strategy demonstrates that assumptions
typically made in the literature are not innocuous, especially regarding the distribution of
policy-induced rents.
Regarding the first order shock (policy shock without oligopsony power), in line
with previous evidence, our results show that ethanol policies greatly benefit the ethanol
sector, but also corn growers (large vertical spillovers). Somewhat in contrast with
evidence at the national level, our results suggest that adverse effects on the livestock and
food sectors are limited. The horizontal spillovers from ethanol policies (effect on
livestock and food sectors) are limited relative to the vertical ones (effect on corn
producers) because the demand for food and livestock products is inelastic (-0.4 and -0.2
respectively). Due to inelasticity of demand, the upward shift in supply caused by
increased corn price (prompted by ethanol policy) translates into a significant increase in
prices of food and livestock products. These increases in prices partially offset the
reduction in equilibrium quantities. As the ability of livestock and food producers to
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substitute away from corn and towards soybeans and DDGS increases, negative
spillovers from ethanol policy into these sectors decreases even more.
Regarding the role of oligopsony power, all else constant, buying power by
ethanol plants should reduce overall policy-induced rents due to plants’ curtailing of corn
purchases along with input price markdown. However, our results indicate that buying
power by ethanol plants does not substantially reduce overall surplus, but does drastically
divert rents away from corn growers and, to a much lesser extent, food and livestock. As
government support for ethanol intensifies (subsidy increases) rent dissipation associated
with plants’ buying power raises. In other words, given plants’ degree of market power,
the share of policy-induced rents appropriated by ethanol plants is larger as the subsidy
increases. Therefore, distortions caused by market power grow as the policy support
grows. These results also demonstrate that benefits for corn growers from ethanol
policies can be greatly diminished by imperfect competition in corn procurement.

5.2

Caveats and Limitations
This study has not explicitly incorporated cross-elasticity constraints that may

tighten up our estimates of equilibrium and welfare displacement associated with policies
and the mediating role of market power on those. This is because we use elasticity
estimates reported in the literature that are not obtained from a single optimization
problem, but rather generated by independent studies. Moreover, most elasticity estimates
utilized in this study represent short-term adjustments. Therefore, our analysis remains
silent regarding longer-term effects. However, while addressing these caveats can greatly
increase precision in our estimates, they are unlikely to modify our qualitative insights.
Certainly, however, the absence of precise, disaggregated elasticity estimations presents
an opportunity for further research.
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APPENDIX A. ELASTICITY DERIVATIONS

1

Log-linearization

In order to proceed with the goal to reach comparative statics for the system, it is
essential to differentiate the equations in (1):
(I) a. ݀ݕௗ = ݂ೖ ݀ௗ
b. ݀ݕ௦ = ݃ೖ ݀௦
c. ݀ௗ = ݀௦ + ݀ݐ
d. ݀ݕௗ = ݀ݕ௦
Once differentiated, the system above can be solved for the changes in the
endogenous variables (prices and quantities in sector k) in terms of the shocks presented
with the variable t.
(I.1) From a., solving for the change in demanders’ quantity, ݀ݕௗ :
݀ݕௗ = ݂ೖ ݀ௗ
݀ௗ = ݀௦ + ݀ ݐÆ ݀௦ =

ௗ௬ೖೞ
 ೖ

Æ ݀௦ =

ௗ௬ೖ
 ೖ

݀ݕௗ
݀ݕௗ = ݂ೖ ቈ
+ ݀ݐ
݃ೖ
݀ݕௗ
݀ݕௗ
=ቈ
+ ݀ݐ
݂ೖ
݃ೖ
݀ݕௗ ݀ݕௗ
െ
= ݀ݐ
݂ೖ ݃ೖ
݀ݕௗ (݃ೖ െ ݂ೖ )
݂ೖ ݃ೖ

= ݀ݐ

݂ೖ ݃ೖ
݀ݕௗ = ቈ
 ݀ݐ
݃ೖ െ ݂ೖ
The algebra for ݀ݕ௦ , ݀ௗ , ݀௦ follows similar procedure taking in account the
interconnectedness of the system within a., b., c., and d., and solving appropriately.
Ultimately, we get:
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 ೖ ೖ

(I.1) ݀ݕௗ = ቈ  ି  ݀ݐ
ೖ

ೖ

 ೖ ೖ

݀ݕ௦ = ቈ  ି  ݀ݐ
ೖ

݀ௗ = ቈ
݀௦ = ቈ

ೖ

 ೖ

ೖ

ିೖ

 ೖ

ೖ

ିೖ

 ݀ݐ

 ݀ݐ

(II) a. ݀ݕௗ = ݂ೖ ݀ௗ i.e.

ௗ௬ೖ
௬ೖ

ݕௗ =

ௗ ೖ  ௬ 

ೖ ೖ

ௗ௬ೖ

ௗೖ ೖ ೖ

௬ೖ

ௗ
 ݀ i.e.

=

ௗ ೖ  ௗ

ೖ
ೖ
ௗೖ ೖ ೖ

The absolute changes, ݀ݕௗ , are then replaced with relative changes, ݀ ln ݕௗ =
ௗ௬ೖ
௬ೖ

, as well as elasticities can be noted in the expression

ௗ௬ೖ
௬ೖ

=

ௗ ೖ  ௗ

ೖ
ೖ
ௗೖ ೖ ೖ

. In

WKLVFDVHZHFDOOȘ– elasticity coming from the demand side. That is, Ʉ =
ௗ ೖ 

ೖ
ௗೖ ೖ

. Last, but not least, we have another relative change conversion,

݀ ln ௗ =

ௗೖ
ೖ

.

Hence: ݀ݕௗ = ݂ೖ ݀ௗ Æ ݀ ln ݕௗ = Ʉ ݀ ln ௗ
b. Similarly, ݀ݕ௦ = ݃ೖ ݀௦ i.e.

ௗ௬ೖೞ
௬ೖೞ

ݕ௦ =

ௗ ೖ ೞ ௬ ೞ

ೖ ೖ
ௗೖೞ

ೖ ೖೞ

݀௦ i.e.

ௗ௬ೖೞ
௬ೖೞ

=

ௗ ೖ ೞ ௗೞ

ೖ
ೖ
ௗೖೞ ೖ ೖೞ

,

and as before, new notation is introduced to reflect elasticity – ıLWLVWKH
elasticity that comes from the supply side.
Thus, we have: ݀ݕ௦ = ݃ೖ ݀௦ Æ ݀ ln ݕ௦ = ɐ ݀ ln ௦
c. The price relationship converses as follows: ݀ ln ݕௗ = ݀ ln ௦ + ݀߬, where ߬ =
ೖ ିೖೞ
ೖೞ

, and ݀߬ HTXDOO\IRUPVĲ

d. The market clearing condition takes a log-linear form as well: ݀ ln ݕௗ = ݀ ln ݕ௦
The next step then is to combine (1.1) and (2) in order to replace slopes such as ݂ೖ and
݃ೖ ZLWKWKHȘDQGıHODVWLFLWLHVUHVSHFWLYHO\3HUIRUPLQJWKLVDFWLRQ\LHOGVWKHIROORZLQJ
 ೖ ೖ

ఎఙ

(III) ݀ݕௗ = ቈ    ݀ ݐyields: ݀ ln ݕௗ = ቂఙିఎቃ ݀߬
 ି
ೖ

ೖ
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 ೖ ೖ

ఎఙ

݀ݕ௦ = ቈ  ି  ݀ ݐyields: ݀ ln ݕ௦ = ቂఙିఎቃ ݀߬
ೖ

݀ௗ = ቈ
݀௦ = ቈ

2

ೖ

 ೖ


ఙ

ିೖ
ೖ
 ೖ


ೖ

 ݀ ݐyields: ݀ ln ௗ = ቂఙିఎቃ ݀߬
ఎ

ିೖ

 ݀ ݐyields: ݀ ln ௦ = ቂఙିఎቃ ݀߬

Multi-Market Equilibrium Displacement

The solutions obtained from the base of the model are readily extended to the
multiple market case, as suggested by Perrin (1997). The above system is represented in
vector and matrix equivalent form,
(I) a. ௗ = ିܦଵ ( )ݕ,
௫ଵ

௫ଵ

b. ௦ = ܵ ିଵ ( )ݕ,
௫ଵ

௫ଵ

c. (Ƹ ௦ )ିଵ ௗ = ߡ + ߬ , where Ƹ ௦ is a diagonal matrix of ௦ ȚLVDXQLWYHFWRU
௫ଵ ௫ଵ

௫ଵ

௫ଵ

DQGĲLVDYHFWRUUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQEHIRUHDQGDIWHUWKHVKRFN
took place – essentially, government or other party’s receipts.
The log differentials of the above equations are:
(II) a. ݀ ln ௗ = ି ܪଵ ݀ ln ݕௗ , where H is a k x k matrix of demand elasticities,
b. ݀ ln ௦ = ߝ ିଵ ݀ ln ݕ௦ , where ߝ is a k x k matrix of supply elasticities, and
c. ݀ ln ௗ െ ݀ ln ௦ = ( ܫ+ ߬Ƹ )݀߬ |ఛୀ = ݀߬.
Note, to further solve the system, (IIa) is multiplied by H, (IIb) is multiplied by İ, and
ultimately, endogenous variables shall be placed on the left and be expressed in detached
coefficient form:
ܪ
(III)  0
ܫ

0
ߝ
െܫ

ௗ
െ ݀ ܫln 

௦
െ ܫ൩  ݀ ln   =   ൩
0
݀߬
݀ ln ݕ
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Moreover, the eventual solution for the endogenous variables (prices and quantities) can
be obtained as,
݀ ln ௗ
ܪ
௦
(IV)  ݀ ln   =  0
ܫ
݀ ln ݕ

0
ߝ
െܫ

െି ܫଵ 
െ ܫ൩   ൩
0
݀߬
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APPENDIX B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK EXTENDED

1

Conjectural Variations Model of Corn Demand by the Ethanol Sector

The oligopsony case is what is used as the layout of the market power specific part in
the model in order to account for the natural disposition of the ethanol plants as buyers of
corn across space. We follow suit from a first-order condition, the profit expression for ith ethanol plant is:
(I) a. ߎ = ܲ ܳ (ܳ  ) െ ܲ (ܳ )ܳ  െ ܴ , where ߎ represents the profit of an ethanol
producer per se, ܲ and ܳ are price and quantity of ethanol, ܲ and ܳ are price
and quantity of corn in the ethanol sector, and ܴ is a term for other processing
costs. The first-order condition is given by,
ୢொ

ୢ

ୢ ୢொ

b. ୢொ  = ܲ ୢொ  െ ୢொ ୢொ  ܳ  െ ܲ = 0, in which, the production of ethanol per








unit of input is represented, in this case, corn.
Next, to prepare the expression for total differentiation, develop specific changes in the
endogenous variables, and clarify, consider the following figure B.1:

ߐ

ܲ

ܲ ଵ
ܲ 

ܳ 



ܳ 

ଵ

ܳ 

Figure B.1 Graph Representing the Corn Quantity Obtained by Plant i at Price ܲ , as well
as Impulse Changes

From (I.b), and figure B.1, further explanation and expansion follows as,
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MR

MFC

ୢ ୢொ ொ  ொ

ୢொ

c. ܲ ୢொ  െ ୢொ ୢொ 






ொ ொ 

ୢொ

ܳ  െ ܲ = 0, where ܲ ୢொ  represents marginal


ת
M

revenue

ୢ ୢொ ொ
(MR),െ ୢொ ୢொ   ܳ

  ொ

െ ܲ is the cost for an increase in unit of production, i.e.

marginal factor cost (MFC),  תis the expression

ୢ ொ 
ୢொ  ொ

, which in the simulation, would

take values between 0 and 1. The idea here is that once ߐ = 0, or is getting closer to zero,
perfect competition is indicated in the market for buying corn for ethanol production. On
the other hand, as  תapproaches a value towards one, market power has emerged of a
specific buyer or plant.  תis the change in slope from the solid yellow line to the dashed
ୢ ୢொ ொ 
ܳ ,

  ொ

yellow line, as seen in figure B.1. Point M in the graph, or the expression െ ୢொ ୢொ 
gives the severity of the shift. From here, total differentiation of (I) yields,
(II) a. െ

ୢమ ொ
ୢொ 

మ

ୢொ

ܲ dܳ  + ୢொ  dܲ െ ߐ


ୢమ 
ୢொ మ

ୢ

ܳ dܳ െ ୢொ ߐdܳ െ dܲ = 0, multiplying


we get,
ୢொ ொ  ொ  ୢ

b. ୢொ 



ொ ொ   

ୢఞ ொ ఞ

ܲ െ ߐ ୢொ



ఞ ொ

ୢ ொ 

ܳ dܳ െ ୢொ  ொ ߐdܳ െ






ୢఞ ொ

ୢ ொ

ୢொ ொ







From (II.b), follows: ߦ = ୢொ

ୢ


ܲ = 0
ொ 

; ߟ௦ = ୢொ ; ߟ = ୢொ ொ; and  = ݏொ   , where ߦ
ఞ




 

is the percentage change in the slope of the corn supply function, ߟ௦ is the
elasticity of the supply of corn, ߟ is the ethanol output response to corn input
(ߟ = 1), and  ݏis the rationalized share of ethanol in relation to corn. ߯ represents
ୢ

the corresponding change ୢொ in the following expression,


price and quantity changes can be expressed as: ݀ ln ܲ =
݀ ln ܳ =

ୢொ
ொ

ୢቀ

ౚು
ቁ
ౚೂ

ୢொ
ୢ


. Furthermore, the

; ݀ ln ܲ =

ୢ


; and

, thus:

(III)
a. ߟ ܲݏ ݀ ln ܲ െ ߐߦߟ௦ ܲ ݀ ln ܳ െ ߐߟ௦ ݀ ln ܳ ܲ െ ݀ ln ܲ ܲ = 0, simplifying,
b. ߟ  ݀ ݏln ܲ െ ߐߦߟ௦ ݀ ln ܳ െ ߐߟ௦ ݀ ln ܳ െ ݀ ln ܲ = 0
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Last, but not least, two sub-scenarios where ߐ takes a value of 0 or 1, or a value in
between:
c. ߟ  ݀ ݏln ܲ െ ߐߟ௦ ݀ ln ܳ (ߦ + 1) െ ݀ ln ܲ = 0
d. ߟ  ݀ ݏln ܲ െ ߐߟ௦ (ߦ + 1)݀ ln ܳ െ ݀ ln ܲ = 0
In order to further explore the relationship between the corn price and the quantity of
corn used as an input in the production process of ethanol, the next series of expressions
follow:
(IV)

ୢ

ୢொ

ୢ ொ 

a. ୢொ = ܲ ୢொ െ ୢொ  ொ ܳ െ ܲ = 0, from where we simplify and










similar to (I.c), we get,
b. ߟ ݀ܲ െ ߟ௦ ݀ܲ െ ݀ܲ = 0

ܲ

ܳ
Figure B.2 Graphic Representing the Corn Supply with Respect to Price

Figure B.2 is the expression c. ܲ = ܳ ఈ , where ߙ > 1. Once differentiated and loglinearized, we can manipulate the expression to allow for elasticity implications, i.e.,
ୢ

(V) a. ߯ = ୢொ = ߙܳ ఈିଵ , and then per the rule of logs, b. follows:


ௗ ୪୬ ఞ

b. ln ߯ = ln ߙ + (ߙ െ 1) ln ܳ Æ ௗ ୪୬ ொ = ߙ െ 1 = ߦ = ߟ௦ െ 1, and, when no


changes,
ୢ

ௗ ୪୬ ఞ

c. ܲ = aܳ i.e. ߯ = ୢொ = a i.e. ln ߯ = ln a i.e. ௗ ୪୬ ொ = 0 = ߦ, where a is a




parameter interacting with the supply in a similar fashion as ߯ as seen in (II.b).
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2

Matrix Multiplication
Explicitly listing all the multi-stakeholder markets and capturing the market

power effect of an ethanol plant across a particular space or specific situation,
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APPENDIX C. INDIVIDUAL VARIABLE RESPONSE

1

Model Solutions for Different Levels of the Ethanol Wedge, Endogenous

Variables:
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݀ ln ݕ calculation based on ݀ ln ݕ = ܧ௬ಲ௫ಲ ݀ ln ݔ :
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